Article VI: AI Chip Production Monitoring

The ISIA will implement monitoring of AI chip production facilities and key inputs to chip production. This monitoring will ensure that all newly produced AI chips are immediately tracked and monitored until they are installed in declared CCCs and that unmonitored supply chains are not established.
1. The ISIA will monitor AI chip production facilities determined to be producing or potentially producing AI chips and relevant hardware [the precise definitions of AI chip production facilities, AI chips, and relevant hardware would need to be further described in an Annex; the monitoring methods would also need to be described in an Annex].
2. Monitoring of newly produced AI chips will include monitoring of production, sale, transfer, and installation. Monitoring of chip production will start with fabrication. The full set of activities includes fabrication of high-bandwidth memory (HBM), fabrication of logic chips, testing, packaging, and assembly [this set of activities would need to be specified in an Annex].

For facilities where ISIA tracking and monitoring is not feasible or implemented, production of AI chips will be halted. Production of AI chips may continue when the ISIA declares that acceptable tracking and monitoring measures have been implemented.
If a monitored chip production facility is decommissioned or repurposed, the ISIA will oversee that process, and, if done to the satisfaction of the ISIA, this ends the monitoring requirement.
No Party shall sell or transfer AI chips or AI chip manufacturing equipment except as authorized and tracked by the ISIA.
1. Sale or transfer of AI chips within or between Treaty Parties shall have a presumption of approval and be tracked by the ISIA.
2. Sale or transfer of AI chip manufacturing equipment within or between Treaty Parties shall not have a presumption of approval. Approval for such transfer shall be based on an assessment of the risk of diversion or Treaty withdrawal of the receiving Party.
3. Sale or transfer of AI chips and AI chip manufacturing equipment to non-Party States or entities outside a Party State shall have a presumption of denial.

No Party shall sell or transfer non-AI advanced computer chips or non-AI advanced computer chip manufacturing equipment to non‑Party States or entities outside a Party State except as authorized and tracked by the ISIA.
Sale or transfer of non-AI advanced computer chips or non-AI advanced computer chip manufacturing equipment within or between Treaty Parties is not restricted under this Article.

Precedent

Treaty provisions for monitoring production facilities are not new. Article XI of the 1987 INF allowed for thirteen years inspections of designated facilities where intermediate-range nuclear delivery systems had previously been produced; Section VII of the accompanying inspection protocol permitted continuous perimeter and portal monitoring that could include weighing (and in some cases x-raying) any vehicle leaving the facility large enough to carry a relevant missile.

Monitoring AI chip production is more complicated, due to the difficulty of discerning a chip’s function and capabilities from outward characteristics; this is why our Article VI stipulates that “relevant hardware would need to be further described in an Annex,” along with monitoring methods. But the experience of IAEA safeguards under the NPT shows that verification of a wide variety of production components and precursors across a supply chain is possible. One way the IAEA does this is by providing guidelines for the design of facilities to make them inspection friendly and reduce compliance costs.

Transfer embargoes on end-products, precursors, and production equipment (like the one suggested here on sale or transfer of AI chips and advanced computer chip manufacturing equipment to non-party states or entities) all have substantial precedent:

In Article I of the NPT, each nuclear-weapon state commits “not to transfer to any recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices” In its Article III, Paragraph 2, they also agree not to provide a “source or special fissionable material” or equipment “especially designed or prepared for the processing, use or production of special fissionable material.”
Article I of the CWC likewise commits parties to never “transfer, directly or indirectly, chemical weapons to anyone”; its Article VII requires them to subject listed precursors to specified “prohibitions on production, acquisition, retention, transfer, and use”
The Cold-War-era Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls (CoCom) established a coordinated set of export controls from Western Bloc countries to the Communist Bloc, covering nuclear-related materials, munitions, and dual-use industrial items such as semiconductors.
The Nuclear Suppliers Group is a multilateral export control regime that restricts the supply of nuclear and nuclear-related technology that could be diverted to nuclear weapons programs.
Especially relevant is the series of U.S. export controls that have focused on AI chips and advanced chip manufacturing equipment, covering dozens of countries in the last couple years.

Notes

The AI chip supply chain is narrow and specialized, making it feasible to monitor production. The vast majority of AI chips are designed by NVIDIA. The most advanced logic chips (the main processor) used in AI chips are almost all fabricated by TSMC — accounting for around 90 percent of market share. Most AI chips are fabricated on versions of TSMC’s five-nanometer process node, a node likely only supported by two or three manufacturing plants. EUV lithography machines, a critical component in advanced logic chip fabrication, are made exclusively by ASML. High-bandwidth memory (HBM), another key component to AI chips, is dominated by two or three companies. This narrow and technical supply chain would be relatively easy to monitor and hard to clandestinely replicate.

Monitoring AI chip production would have relatively small spillover effects. While some of the same processes also produce other chips (e.g., smartphone chips), the chips themselves are easily differentiated. Chip design would change over time, but as a snapshot, current AI chips would be identifiable via their large high-bandwidth memory (HBM) capacity and specialized matrix-multiply components, among other factors.

When it comes to monitoring the AI chip supply chain, based on existing bottlenecks, a good start might be to monitor HBM production, logic die fabrication, and subsequent steps (e.g., packaging, testing, server assembly), along with key inputs such as EUV lithography machines.

Our Article states that sales of AI chips within Party states will have a presumption of approval, but does not indicate this presumption for AI chip manufacturing equipment. Chip sales are likely to have a relatively short-term effect on AI development capacity, as the lifecycle of AI chips is typically only a few years. By contrast, chip manufacturing capacity could lead to significant chip production for many years to come, and it would be especially concerning if a country became a Party, built up an AI chip supply chain, and then withdrew from the treaty. Therefore, we suggest more conservative restrictions on chip manufacturing equipment than on chips themselves.

Paragraphs 4 and 5 of this article permit the sale of AI chips and chip manufacturing equipment to Treaty Parties but not to non-Party States or other entities. That is, parties accept risks from chip manufacturing and concentration, but only in cases where the chips are subject to monitoring. The ability to manufacture and possess chips without a protective response from other states thus emerges as a positive incentive to join the treaty.

On its own, this does not prevent non-Treaty Parties from accessing AI chips in Treaty Parties remotely (i.e., cloud computing, or Infrastructure-as-a-Service), but such chips would be under ISIA monitoring to ensure they are not being used in violation of Article IV.

Restrictions on non-parties could go further, if need be. For example, non-parties could be banned from remote access to AI chips (i.e., from renting AI chips in Treaty countries via the cloud) or from accessing AI models via APIs.

If monitoring chip production and preventing smuggling were infeasible, another approach would be to ban all production of new AI chips. This approach would run less of a risk of chips being diverted, but it has the cost of losing the value that these chips could have produced in non-research, non-development AI applications. It would still rely on some monitoring of chip production facilities — e.g., to ensure they are only producing non-AI chips or that they are decommissioned. Our treaty design invites chip production to continue due to the large benefits their use might bring, with the dangers mitigated by monitoring (Article VII).

Article VII: Chip Use Verification

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